Better the devil you know? Non-conscious processing of identity and affect of famous faces by Stone, A. et al.
 
 
University of East London Institutional Repository: http://roar.uel.ac.uk  
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please 
scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this 
item and our policy information available from the repository home page for further 
information. 
 
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s): Stone, Anna; Valentine, Tim. 
Article title: Better the devil you know? Non-conscious processing of identity and 
affect of famous faces 
Year of publication: 2004 
Citation: Stone, A., & Valentine, T. (2004) ‘Better the devil you know? Non-
conscious processing of identity and affect of famous faces.’ Psychonomic Bulletin 
and Review, 11 (3) pp. 469-474. 
Link to published version:  
http://pbr.psychonomic-journals.org/content/11/3/469.abstract  
 
 
 
Better the devil you know? 
Non-conscious processing of identity and affect of famous faces 
 
 
 
Anna Stone and Tim Valentine 
Department of Psychology 
Goldsmiths College 
University of London 
 
 
 
Running head: Better the devil you know 
 
 
 
Author contact details: 
 
Anna Stone 
Department of Psychology 
Goldsmiths College 
University of London 
New Cross 
London Se14 6NW 
 
Email: A.Stone@uel.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The non-conscious recognition of facial identity was investigated in two experiments 
featuring brief (17-msec) masked stimulus presentation to prevent conscious recognition. 
Faces were presented in simultaneous pairs of one famous face and one unfamiliar face, and 
participants attempted to select the famous face. Subsequently, participants rated the famous 
persons as “good” or “evil” (Experiment 1) or liked or disliked (Experiment 2). In 
Experiments 1 and 2, responses were less accurate to faces of persons rated evil/disliked than 
to faces of persons rated good/liked, and faces of persons rated evil/disliked were selected 
significantly below chance. Experiment 2 showed the effect in a within-items analysis: a 
famous face was selected less often by participants who disliked the person than by 
participants who liked the person, and the former were selected below chance accuracy. The 
within-items analysis rules out possible confounding factors based on variations in physical 
characteristics of the stimulus faces and confirms that the effects are due to participants’ 
attitudes toward the famous persons. The results suggest that facial identity is recognized pre-
consciously, and that responses may be based on affect rather than familiarity. 
 
Introduction 
There is considerable evidence that facial expressions can be detected pre-consciously 
and can influence psychophysiological and behavioural responses without awareness (e.g., 
Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Johnsen & Hugdahl, 1991, 
1993; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Niedenthal, 1990; Öhman, Esteves, 
& Soares, 1995; Saban & Hugdahl, 1999; Whalen et al., 1998; Wong, Shevrin, & Williams, 
1994; see Robinson, 1998, for a review). In all of these studies, conscious awareness was 
prevented by presenting masked faces for very brief exposure duration, using target-to-mask 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of less than 35 msec. The absence of awareness was 
verified by chance performance in two alternative forced choice tasks on stimuli presented 
under conditions similar to the experiment tasks.  
The question arises of whether facial identities, like facial expressions, can be 
detected without conscious awareness. While there is a strong body of evidence supporting 
covert face recognition in prosopagnosia (e.g., Young, 1998, offers an extensive review), 
there is less empirical support for the non-conscious recognition of facial identity by 
neurologically intact participants. Ellis, Young, and Koenken (1993) and Morrison, Bruce, 
and Burton (2000) claim to have demonstrated non-conscious perception of facial identity, 
but it is unclear from the methodology that conscious recognition was entirely absent from 
exposure duration in excess of 50 msec (see Stone, Valentine, & Davis, 2001, for a critique of 
their methods).  
Stone et al. (2001, Experiment 1) reported that skin conductance responses to 
consciously unrecognized masked 17-msec faces were higher to the faces of famous persons 
subsequently rated “good” than to the faces of persons rated “evil,” but did not distinguish 
between the faces of famous and unfamiliar persons (responses tended to be higher to “good” 
faces than to unfamiliar faces, but tended to be lower to “evil” faces than to unfamiliar faces). 
Conversely, when faces were exposed for 200 msec, a duration that permits conscious 
recognition, there was an effect of familiarity but no effect of valence: Skin conductance 
responses were higher to famous faces than to unfamiliar faces with no difference between 
“good” and “evil” faces. Responses were above chance accuracy in a two-alternative forced 
choice of good or evil to masked 17-msec famous faces that were not consciously recognized 
(Experiment 3). It appears that when famous faces are perceived non-consciously, responses 
are based on affective valence but not based on familiarity per se. 
The model of face recognition proposed by Breen, Caine, and Coltheart (2000) offers 
an explanation. This model describes two parallel routes: the semantic route, concerned with 
familiarity detection (based on the Bruce & Young, 1986, model of face recognition, 
extended and developed by Burton, Bruce, & Johnston, 1990), and the affective route, which 
mediates responses on the basis of the emotional significance of a face. The results of Stone 
et al. (2001) suggest that when faces are presented with-out conscious awareness to 
unimpaired participants, the affective route is activated, resulting in discrimination of faces 
according to their affective valence, detectable by autonomic and behavioural measures. The 
semantic route, on the other hand, is either insufficiently activated or is overridden by the 
affective response, so there is no autonomic discrimination of face familiarity.  
The experiments reported here investigated differential responses to faces of famous 
persons regarded as good/liked and evil/disliked using an alternative behavioural measure. 
Two faces were presented simultaneously for 17 msec, one each in left visual field (LVF) and 
right visual field (RVF), with each pair comprising one famous and one unfamiliar face. 
Participants were asked to guess in which visual field the famous face had appeared. The 
logic of the design is as follows. If participants were able to recognize faces consciously, then 
the task of selecting the famous face would be easy, so overall performance at the level of 
chance demonstrates the absence of conscious recognition.  
On the basis of previous unpublished experiments and Stone et al. (2001), it was 
predicted that faces of persons subsequently rated good/liked would be selected more often 
than faces of persons subsequently rated evil/disliked. That is, given the choice of a 
good/liked famous person and an unfamiliar person, participants would tend to select the 
famous face, but given the choice of an evil/disliked famous person and an unfamiliar person, 
participants would tend to select the unfamiliar face. In particular, if evil/disliked faces were 
selected below chance, this would demonstrate that recognition had occurred and that 
recognition was not accompanied by awareness precisely because this would be contrary to 
the task instruction. 
It should be noted that these experiments do not investigate the mere exposure effect, 
which would predict the above-chance selection of famous faces due to their familiarity, but 
rather the opposite in the case of evil faces. It was predicted that faces of evil persons would 
be selected below chance due to their negative valence.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 34 students, staff, and visitors at Goldsmiths College, 
London. Every participant’s individual performance was at chance in selecting famous as 
opposed to unfamiliar faces (binomial distribution, one-tailed, α = 0.05). Data were excluded 
from 7 participants who failed to identify a minimum of 8 faces in total, and a minimum of 2 
rated good and 2 rated evil, in the post-experimental rating task. The remaining 27 
participants were 18 females and 9 males, aged between 20 and 51 years (M = 27.2, SD = 
7.5). All of the participants had been residents in the United Kingdom for at least 10 years, 
which should maximize the likelihood of knowledge of the famous faces.  
Stimuli. Photographs of famous and unfamiliar faces of a uniform quality were 
digitized to produce images of 16 greys, 150 - 200 pixels in size. The faces displayed a 
frontal pose with a near neutral expression and the direction of eye gaze pointing directly to 
the camera. Five evil famous persons and five good persons (listed in the Appendix) were 
each paired with an unknown face of the same sex, race, and approximate age, and with a 
similar pose and facial expression.  
Distinctiveness was rated by 10 participants on a 7-point scale (1 = very typical, 7 = 
very distinctive). Distinctiveness did not differ between the evil faces and their paired 
unfamiliar faces [t (8) = 1.34, n.s.], or between the good faces and their paired unfamiliar 
faces [t (8) = 0.82, n.s.]. Facial emotional expression was rated by 11 participants on a 7-
point scale (-3 =very negative, +3 = very positive). Expression did not differ between the evil 
faces and their paired unfamiliar faces [t (8) = 0.68, n.s.] or between the good faces and their 
paired unfamiliar faces [t (8) = 0.62, n.s.]. The mask was a rectangle of jumbled face parts, all 
taken from unfamiliar faces, of the same size as the stimuli.  
Apparatus. A personal computer running MEL2 software was used to display the 
faces at a 640 _ 480 screen resolution. Accuracy of response was measured and recorded by 
the computer.  
Design. The within-subjects factor was valence of famous face, defined by each 
participant for each item in a post-experimental rating task, and the dependent variable was 
accuracy of response. Each face pair was presented four times, with the famous face 
appearing twice each in LVF and RVF, giving 40 trials in total. The trials were presented in a 
sequence randomized by the computer for each participant. 
The exposure duration of 17 msec (defined as target-to-mask SOA) was selected from 
the technologically available options of 17 or 33 msec following pilot studies suggesting 
conscious perception on up to 10% of trials at 33 msec but fewer than 1% of trials at 17 msec 
with faces presented singly.  
Procedure. Another, unrelated, task preceded the task reported here, in which masked 
faces were presented for 17 msec. Participants performed individually in a darkened, air-
conditioned room at a constant level of background lighting. The task was described and 
participants were instructed to guess their responses if they were unable to see the faces. 
Following 8 practice trials, the 40 experimental trials were presented in a sequence 
randomized by computer for each participant. The faces were presented simultaneously at a 
distance of 9 cm apart with each face subtending a visual angle of approximately 2.6º _ 4º.  
Each trial consisted of the following sequence: a central fixation point, forward masks 
in LVF and RVF for 100 msec, famous and unfamiliar face for 17 msec, immediately 
followed by backward masks in LVF and RVF for 100 msec, and finally the question “left or 
right?” displayed until the participant responded. Each trial was initiated by the response to 
the preceding trial after an inter-trial interval of 1 sec. Participants were required to select on 
which side of the screen the famous face had appeared. They were asked to respond as 
accurately as possible but were not asked to respond quickly.  
After the computer task, participants were asked about their perception during the 
task. Then they were shown the famous faces used in the experiment and asked to identify 
each face and provide a rating of valence (-3 = very evil, 0 = neutral, +3 = very good). 
Participants were instructed that they should give their personal opinion, considering 
their knowledge of each famous person. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for 
their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
If a participant was unable to identify a famous face in the post-experimental rating 
task, the responses for this combination of participant and item were excluded from the 
analysis. Responses faster than 200 msec from face offset were excluded as probable 
anticipations. Slow responses were included because participants had not been asked to 
respond quickly. Faces were classified as evil or good according to the participant’s own 
rating, with faces rated zero being classified as good.  
All participants insisted they had been unable to recognize any of the faces during the 
experimental task. Most participants had occasionally perceived face outlines or individual 
features, either eyes or mouth. The mean proportion of correct responses to famous faces was 
.469, obviously not above the chance level of .50, consistent with participants’ self-report and 
confirming the absence of conscious recognition. The prediction of lower accuracy for evil 
faces was confirmed: A lower proportion of evil faces (M = 0.441, SD = 0.11) than of good 
faces (M= 0.508, SD = 0.11) were selected [paired-samples [t (26) = 1.99, p _ .03, one-
tailed]. One-sample t tests revealed that evil faces were selected significantly less often than 
chance [t(26) = 2.68, p < 0.01, one-tailed], and good faces were selected at chance [t(26) = 
0.37, n.s]. (See Figure 1.)  
Figure 1 about here 
Below-chance selection of evil faces demonstrates that participants had detected 
unique facial identity and affective valence, and done so without awareness since below-
chance selection of the evil faces was contrary to the task instruction.  
Participants had been asked to choose between a famous and an unfamiliar face on 
each trial, where the faces differed slightly on distinctiveness and on facial expression. A 
possible confound exists if the good faces differed from their paired unfamiliar faces in such 
a way that the good faces were more likely to be selected, while the evil faces differed from 
their paired unfamiliar faces in the opposite direction. Paired-samples t tests were performed 
by applying the pre-experimental ratings of expressions and distinctiveness to the faces in the 
categories of evil and good as defined by each experimental participant. Regarding 
distinctiveness, the evil faces (M = 5.06, SD = 0.29) were more distinctive than their paired 
unfamiliar faces [M = 4.44, SD = 0.16; t(26) = 8.50, p < 0.001]. The good faces (M = 4.82, 
SD = 0.23) were also more distinctive than their paired unfamiliar faces [M = 4.20, SD = 
0.21; t(26) = 9.27, p < 0.001]. The variation in distinctiveness favoured both good and evil 
faces over unfamiliar faces, and so it cannot explain the superior selection of good faces over 
evil faces. Regarding facial expression, the evil faces (M = 0.42, SD = 0.28) had more 
positive expressions than the paired unfamiliar faces [M = 0.60, SD = 0.07, t(26) = 3.81, p < 
0.001]. The good faces (M = 0.20, SD = 0.47) also had more positive expression than the 
paired unfamiliar faces [M = 0.36, SD = 0.12, t(26) = 6.47, p < 0.001]. The variation in facial 
expression favoured both good and evil faces over unfamiliar faces, and so it cannot explain 
the superior selection of good faces over evil faces. 
Despite the control used to match good and evil faces on key characteristics, it could 
be argued that the results were due to variation in some other visual characteristics that 
differed systematically between faces of “good” and “evil” people. Any such artefact could 
be eliminated by an experiment in which the manipulation of valence involves a within-items 
comparison. This strategy was adopted in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
Stimuli in Experiment 2 were the faces of 32 famous persons, liked and disliked in 
roughly equal proportions by participants (n = 56) in a previous unpublished experiment. 
Each participant in the present experiment rated all of the 32 faces as liked or disliked. For 
each participant, liked and disliked faces were selected according to the participant’s own 
ratings. For each item, participants who liked and disliked the item were selected according to 
the same ratings.  
The affective priming literature shows that priming is obtained with SOA of up to 300 
msec but is unreliable at longer SOA (e.g., de Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; Glaser & 
Banaji, 1999; Hermans, de Houwer, & Eelen, 1994, 2001; Klauer, Rossnagel, & Musch, 
1997; see Fazio, 2001, for a review). These data suggest that the valence of a stimulus is 
rapidly activated and then either decays or is suppressed quickly. The exact speed of 
activation and decay or suppression may depend on the stimulus exposure, with a longer 
duration of neural computation required for very briefly exposed stimuli. It seems likely that 
a strong effect of valence of facial identity might be found in the present experiment if 
participants were asked to respond quickly. Therefore, instructions to respond quickly were 
emphasized in Experiment 2. 
Method 
Only the relevant differences from Experiment 1 will be described here. 
Participants. Participants were 22 students at Goldsmiths College, London. Data 
were excluded from 1 participant who lacked familiarity with the famous faces and from 1 
participant who selected more famous faces than were expected by chance (binomial 
distribution, one-tailed, cut-off at 57%, α = 0.05) since for this participant the possibility of 
some partial awareness cannot be ruled out. The remaining 20 participants were 16 females 
and 4 males, aged between 18 and 42 (M = 23.6, SD = 5.7).  
Stimuli. The stimulus set comprised 32 pairs of one famous and one unfamiliar face 
matched on sex, race, and approximate age, and with a similar pose and facial expression. 
Names are listed in Table 1.  
Design. Stimuli were presented once each in four blocks of 32 trials, giving a total of 
128 trials. Face pairs were randomly divided into two sets. Half the participants saw the first 
set with the famous face in the LVF in Blocks 1 and 3 and in the RVF in Blocks 2 and 4, and 
the second set with the famous face in the RVF in Blocks 1 and 3 and the LVF in Blocks 2 
and 4. The other half of the participants had the alternative arrangement. This design ensured 
equal numbers of famous faces in LVF and RVF in each block and minimized the likelihood 
that the same face would be presented twice in succession. Within each block, the sequence 
of presentation was randomized by the computer for each participant. There was one within-
items and one within-subjects factor of valence. 
Procedure. The post experimental rating question was changed to use the terms like 
and dislike rather than good and evil. Participants were asked to respond quickly on each trial, 
and this instruction was emphasized after the practice trials had been completed. 
Results and Discussion 
If a participant was unable to identify uniquely a famous face in the post-experimental 
rating task, the trials for this combination of participant and item were excluded from the 
analysis (12% of trials). Responses faster than 200 msec from face offset were excluded as 
probable anticipations (3.2% of trials), and responses slower than 1,500 msec were excluded 
because participants had been asked to respond quickly (1.7% of trials). Faces were classified 
as liked or disliked according to the participant’s own rating, with faces rated as zero being 
classified as liked in order to distinguish between disliked persons and the rest. Faces were 
included in the analysis if they were rated disliked by at least 2 participants, resulting in the 
inclusion of 30 of the original 32 items. The participants’ analysis was calculated over these 
items. The percentage of participants rating each face as disliked ranged from 13% to 75% 
with a mean of 40%. 
All participants insisted they had been unable to recognize any of the faces during the 
experimental task. Most participants had occasionally received vague impressions of face 
outlines and a minority had perceived gender on one or two trials, or had seen a pair of 
glasses. The mean proportion of correct responses to famous faces was .496, obviously not 
above the chance level of .50, consistent with participants’ self-report and confirming the 
absence of conscious recognition. 
For each participant, mean accuracy was calculated over the faces rated as liked and 
separately over the faces rated as disliked. So two values were calculated for each participant: 
accuracy-likedp (M = 0.524, SD = 0.05) and accuracy-dislikedp (M = 0.432, SD = 0.09). 
Similarly, for each face, mean accuracy was calculated over all participants rating the face as 
liked and separately over all participants rating the face as disliked. So two values were 
calculated for each face: accuracy-likedi (M = 0.522, SD = 0.07) and accuracy-dislikedi (M = 
0.457, SD = 0.11). Where a face was liked and disliked in unequal proportions, different 
numbers of participants contributed to the calculation of accuracy-likedi and accuracy-
dislikedi. 
Paired-samples t tests by participants (tp) and by items (ti) revealed that disliked faces 
were selected less often than liked faces [tp(19) = 4.80, p < 0.001, and ti(29) = 2.89, p < 0.005 
(one-tailed)]. One-sample t tests comparing accuracy against the chance level of .50 showed 
that disliked faces were selected below chance [tp(19) = 3.40, p < 0.005, and ti(29) = 2.14, p < 
0.025]. Liked faces were selected above chance [tp(19) = 2.17, p < 0.025, and ti(29)  = 1.72, p 
< 0.05]. Table 1 and Figure 2 show accuracy-likedi and accuracy-dislikedi for each item, as 
well as the number of participants rating the face as liked and disliked. 
Table 1 about here 
Figure 2 about here 
As in Experiment 1, below-chance selection of disliked faces demonstrates that 
participants had detected unique facial identity and affective valence, and done so without 
awareness since below-chance selection of disliked faces was contrary to the task instruction. 
The within-items analysis rules out confounds based on variations in physical characteristics 
of the stimulus faces.  
General Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that, although instructed to select the famous face in a 
pair, participants were significantly more likely to select the unfamiliar face instead, when the 
famous face belonged to a person rated evil. Experiment 2 replicated this effect with faces 
rated disliked and also showed that faces rated liked were selected above chance. The within-
items analysis in Experiment 2 rules out possible confounds based on physical characteristics 
of the faces and confirms that the effects are due to participant attitudes toward the famous 
persons. 
Experiment 2 used persons who were not known for particularly evil or violent deeds 
and so were not likely to have been regarded as specifically threatening. The effect 
generalized to persons who were merely disliked, although in a sense the face of a disliked 
person does threaten to invoke an unpleasant emotional experience.  
In terms of the Breen et al. (2000) model, responses to evil/disliked faces were 
determined more by the affective route than by the semantic route. The negative valence 
associated with these faces was sometimes sufficiently powerful to override the familiarity 
signal. Participants may have tended to select the good/liked faces because of either their 
familiarity or their positive valence. The data presented here do not permit these two 
possibilities to be distinguished. The study by Greve and Bauer (1990) is suggestive in this 
respect. Their prosopagnosic participant was presented with pairs of faces in which one had 
been studied in an earlier phase and the other was new. The participant selected more of the 
previously studied faces when asked to select the preferred face than when explicitly asked to 
select the previously studied face. The preference for the previously studied face can be 
explained in terms of the mere exposure effect, which states that a familiar item tends to be 
preferred over an unfamiliar item, all other things being equal (Zajonc, 1980; see Zajonc, 
2001, for a review). The Greve and Bauer study suggests that preference could be detected 
more strongly than familiarity per se.  
The above-chance selection of liked faces in Experiment 2 can be compared with the 
performance of prosopagnosic participants given a similar task of deciding which of two 
simultaneously presented faces is familiar. A number of studies have reported that densely 
prosopagnosic participants cannot achieve accuracy above the level of chance in this task 
(e.g., Bobes et al., 2003; De Haan, Bauer, & Greve, 1992; De Haan, Young, & Newcombe, 
1992; Diamond, Valentine, Mayes, & Sandel, 1994; Newcombe, Young, & De Haan, 1989; 
Sergent & Signoret, 1992; Sperber & Spinnler, 2003; Young & De Haan, 1988). This is 
somewhat surprising since other measures of covert face recognition demonstrate some 
preservation of ability to retrieve semantic information, suggesting that the faces must have 
been recognized, albeit without awareness. Stone and Valentine (2003) presented an analysis 
suggesting that although each participant shows performance not significantly above chance 
when considered as a single case study, the participants may be above chance accuracy when 
analyzed as a group. Although performance is severely impaired, it may have been premature 
to conclude that densely prosopagnosic participants are entirely unable to detect familiarity in 
a direct test. 
Esteves and Öhman (1993) theorized that early processes in visual perception may 
respond to particular stimulus features associated with threat. For example, angry expressions 
may be detected from individual features such as angle of eyebrows. This does not apply to 
detection of facial identity since recognition of a specific individual requires a holistic, 
structural perception of the face. That significant effects were found with facial identity 
indicates that a structural analysis of considerable detail was available from 17-msec masked 
exposure without resulting in awareness.  
In conclusion, the two experiments reported here suggest that facial identity is 
recognized pre-consciously, that the valence associated with a known face is activated 
automatically, and that unfamiliar faces are selected in preference to the faces of evil/disliked 
persons. 
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Appendix 
Famous Faces in Experiment 1 
Evil Faces (from participants’ ratings)  Good Faces 
Adolf Hitler  Cliff Richard (singer) 
Myra Hindley (murderess)  Richard Gere (film actor) 
Saddam Hussein (Iraqi dictator)  John F. Kennedy (U.S. president) 
Mike Tyson (rapist)  Chris Evans (U.K. TV presenter) 
Margaret Thatcher (U.K. prime minister)  Mick Jagger (singer) 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of Item Data 
Face No. 
disliked 
No.  
liked 
Proportion 
disliked 
Accuracy 
disliked 
Accuracy 
liked 
Tony Blair 15 5 .75 .47 .63 
Margaret Thatcher 13 6 .68 .38 .33 
Michael Barrymore 10 7 .59 .41 .63 
William Hague 10 7 .59 .41 .42 
Geri Halliwell 11 8 .58 .31 .53 
Liam Gallagher 9 7 .56 .44 .50 
John Major 9 7 .56 .56 .57 
Yasser Arafat 8 7 .53 .41 .60 
Naomi Campbell 10 9 .53 .50 .57 
Jeremy Beadle 6 6 .50 .57 .43 
John Prescott 7 8 .47 .48 .52 
Puff Daddy 7 9 .44 .39 .44 
Paul Daniels 6 8 .43 .52 .48 
Chris Evans 8 11 .42 .48 .55 
Jennifer Lopez 8 11 .42 .34 .56 
Victoria Beckham 8 12 .40 .63 .55 
Prince Charles 7 13 .35 .46 .58 
Robbie Williams 7 13 .35 .33 .54 
Britney Spears 6 11 .35 .48 .50 
Queen Elizabeth 6 13 .32 .39 .55 
Anne Widdecombe 5 11 .31 .33 .49 
Michael Jackson 6 14 .30 .59 .62 
Camilla Parker-Bowles 4 11 .27 .38 .51 
Whitney Houston 5 14 .26 .58 .47 
Anne Robinson 5 14 .26 .58 .42 
Richard Madeley 4 14 .22 .57 .53 
Russell Crowe 3 14 .18 .40 .60 
Leonardo Dicaprio 3 17 .15 .58 .52 
Liz Hurley 3 17 .15 .58 .56 
Mick Jagger 2 14 .13 .14 .46 
Note—Columns 2 and 3 show the number of participants rating the face as disliked/liked; 
column 4 shows the proportion of participants rating the face as disliked; columns 5 and 6 
show the mean accuracy of responses to the face calculated over participants rating the face 
as disliked/liked. 
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Figure 1: mean accuracy of responses to good and evil faces in Experiment 1, analysis 
by participants. Bars represent standard errors.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 
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Figure 2: mean accuracy of responses to liked and disliked faces in Experiment 2, 
analysis by participants. Bars represent standard errors.  
 
